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RECRAFTING A TROJAN HORSE: THOUGHTS
ON WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE IN LIGHT OF
RECENT BRITISH LABOR LAW
DEVELOPMENTS
James J. Brudneyt
INTRODUCTION
In June of 2000, Britain established a statutory union recognition
procedure applicable to all private and public employers with more
than twenty workers.1 For a country with a history of voluntarism in
labor-management relations,2 the creation of a legal mechanism by
which unions could compel recognition from employers was a major
change. The Labour Party government modeled its new approach to
a considerable extent on our National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3
Unions seeking statutory recognition must apply through a
government agency; disagreements over proposed unit size or scope
are to be resolved early by the agency; the union must show majority
support to succeed; this support can be demonstrated through non-
electoral means but upon agency review a supervised election may be
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Estlund, Fred Feinstein, and Simon Gouldstone. Chad Eggspuelher and the Moritz College of
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1. Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, c. 53 (Eng.) [hereinafter
TULRCA], amended by The Employment Relations Act, 1999, c. 26 (Eng.). The Employment
Relations Act 1999 inserted Schedule Al into TULRCA.
2. See generally JOHN BOWERS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 476 (6th ed. 2002); Ford Motor Co.
Ltd. v. Amalg. Union of Eng'g & Foundry Workers, [1969] 2 All Eng. Rep. 481 (Q.B.). There
was an unsuccessful legislative experiment with statutory recognition in the 1970s. See Nicholas
Robertson, Compulsory Trade Union Recognition: New Rights for Trade Unions in the United
Kingdom, 10 INT'L CO. & COMM. L. REV. 303, 303 (1999).
3. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 48 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(2000)). See generally Editorial, The Portability of Collective Bargaining Law, 20 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 1, 2 (1998) Hazel Oliver, Trade Union Recognition: "Fairness at Work"?, 20 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 33, 34 (1998); Chris Ball, Union City Blues, THE EVENING STANDARD
(London), Sept. 11, 2000, at 7.
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ordered; and any such election is preceded by a campaign period of
several weeks during which rules against employer threats and
intimidation are enforced by the agency.
In addition, paralleling a philosophy ascribed to our Taft-Hartley
Amendments, Britain's new recognition procedure reflects a
commitment to employee freedom of choice. Workers may decide
either to join a union that seeks legal recognition or to refrain from
doing so. The public policy value attached to having union
recognition and collective bargaining enforced through a government
agency derives primarily from that arrangement being freely chosen
by the employees, not from the preferred status of collective
bargaining.'
Domestic criticism of the NLRA has persisted with some
intensity since the early 1980s. Union leaders and many labor
relations scholars in the United States believe that the statute as
written and enforced has played an important role in the steady
decline of union organizing and collective bargaining among private
sector employees. British union leadership, aware of such widespread
misgivings, had reason to fear the arrival of this gift from across the
Atlantic The concern was that an American-style union recognition
system, based on adversarial representation campaigns and
government-supervised elections, would invite if not encourage many
of the same problems of excessive delay, employer abuse, and
protracted and bitter litigation that have become entrenched under
the NLRA.
The British statutory procedure is now in its seventh year of
operation, and American-style problems have yet to materialize on
any substantial scale. Although the number of employees organized
through statutory recognition awards has been lower than anticipated,
4. See generally Bob Simpson, Research and Reports, Dept. of Trade & Industry, Fairness
at Work, 27 IND. L.J. 245, 248-49 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Greg Gordon, United They Stand?, THE SCOTSMAN, Sept. 19, 2000 at 11
(reporting that British union officials "are crossing their fingers that the confrontational tactics
of America's union-busting law firms and consultants will not be employed here"); Diane
Taylor, Working Lives: Who You Gonna Call?, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 1, 2000 (Features
Sections), at 10 (quoting union supporters who urged government to adopt European model
rather than election-based American system). See also Oliver August, US Provides Lessons on
Trade Union Law Changes, THE TIMES, June 4, 1997, Business (reporting that NLRB chair
warned labor government about excessive litigation and other serious deficiencies under U.S.
system being used as a blueprint for British legislation); Joseph R. Grodin, Some Thoughts on
the American Model, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 29 (1998) (expressing concerns of an
American labor law scholar that Britain should hesitate before buying into the flawed NLRA
model); Roy J. Adams, Why Statutory Union Recognition is Bad Labour Policy: The North
American Experience, 30 INDUS. REL. J. 96 (1999) (expressing similar concerns of a Canadian
law professor familiar with problems of NLRA model).
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there has been a surge in voluntary recognition agreements negotiated
in the shadow of the law.6 Further, the statutory procedure itself
seems to have been well received by both labor and management,
with only eight instances of judicial review sought for the first 600
agency determinations
It remains early in the life of this new approach-NLRA
implementation in its seventh year (1941) hardly resembled or even
foreshadowed the changed legal circumstances that emerged in
ensuing years and decades. Further, there are culture-specific factors
involved in British experience with workplace governance that
caution against easy transplantation, even as concepts borrowed from
the NLRA are likely to evolve very differently in British legal soil.8
Still, initial developments under this recognition procedure may offer
some guidance as we contemplate ways to reinvent our own statutory
approach to labor-management relations.
This article briefly addresses two aspects of the new British
procedure, with an eye toward what they might contribute in the
American setting. Part I discusses the multi-stage recognition
arrangement, and why it has stimulated both sides to seek voluntary
recognition agreements at various points. Part II examines the
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), the agency that administers
and enforces the statute, focusing on how the CAC's decisionmaking
framework and its method of appointment have contributed to an
efficient and non-partisan adjudication process. In each part, the
article suggests ways in which elements of the British experience
might relate to the American context.
A threshold question is whether to bother with such an inquiry as
part of a symposium addressing the future of governing the
workplace. Both the United States and Britain have experienced a
steady erosion in union membership since the 1970s, and there is
reason to believe that union density may continue to decline,
especially in the private sector. Given that collective bargaining
agreements have been supplanted by statutes and regulations as the
principal source of employee protections in the United States, why
discuss ways to promote or preserve such collective agreements when
examining possible new directions for workplace governance?
6. See Gregor Gall, The First Five Years of Britain's Third Statutory Recognition
Procedure, 34 INDUS. L.J. 345 (2005); Sonja McKay & Siam Moore, Union Recognition
Agreements in the Shadow of the Law, 33 INDUS. L.J. 374 (2004).
7. See CENT. ARB. COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 2004-2005, 15 (2005) (U.K.) [hereinafter
CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2005].
8. See generally Otto Kahn-Freund, On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
MOD L. REV. 1 (1974).
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Paul Weiler wrestled with this question nearly two decades ago,
and as in so many other respects he was ahead of his time. Professor
Weiler recognized that collective bargaining was unlikely to regain its
former position of pre-eminence for reasons that went well beyond
the inadequacies of the NLRA legal regime. He pointed unflinchingly
to American workers' general perception of the labor market as
delivering decent wages and employment conditions under a loosely
competitive structure, and to workers' general reluctance to embrace
traditionally hierarchical union organizations as an alternative to
individual bargaining with their employers.9 At the same time, Weiler
made a powerful case for why the nonunion labor market operates to
distort workers' perceptions and expectations regarding the economic
advantages associated with their jobs.'0 Absent some form of ongoing
workplace representation, employees often are denied benefits in a
market-oriented system. They also are left unable to remedy
employer misconduct much of the time in a rights-based regime.11
Weiler's proposed solution included a different kind of employee
participatory mechanism-mandated by statute at the workplace-
specific level and charged with addressing a range of distributional
decisions inside the firm."2 Political realities in the United States may
well preclude such a distinctive statutory approach, although a version
of Weiler's proposal has been developing in Britain with assistance
from the European Community. 3 Meanwhile, labor organizations
authorized to speak for employees as a group remain relevant in the
American setting for the economic and participatory reasons Weiler
elegantly recounted.
Accordingly, for present purposes I accept that unions should and
will continue to play a role in overcoming certain market-based
9. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW, 280, 282 (1990).
10. See id. at 63-78.
11. See, e.g., id. at 76-82 (discussing how in non-union setting, long-service employees and
lower-salaried workers are worse off in terms of protecting job security); id. at 29, 84-87
(discussing importance of continuous union monitoring to safeguard effectiveness of
reinstatement remedy, health and safety standards, and other legal norms).
12. See id. at 284-86 (recommending a German-style Works Council model).
13. See, e.g., TULRCA, supra note 1, §§ 188-94 (requiring employers to consult with
employee representatives on proposed dismissals for redundancy); Transfer of Undertakings
(Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, S.I. 1981/1794 (U.K.), amended by Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/246 (requiring employers
to consult with employee representatives on proposed business transfers); Transnational
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999/3323 (requiring large
transnational employers to establish a mechanism at European level for informing and
consulting employees about transnational issues.) Each of these British statutes was enacted to
comply with European Council directives; the 1999 statute was Britain's response to the
European Works Council Directive of 1994. See generally BOWERS, supra note 2, at 495-96.
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barriers to improved working conditions, in monitoring the effective
delivery of statutory rights, and in offering employees a meaningful
voice to address their employer's resource allocation policies. I
further assume (with guarded optimism) that incremental reform of
our labor law statute may become possible within the foreseeable
future. Against this background, I focus on two aspects of Britain's
recent statutory experience with union recognition that warrant
attention when considering revisions to our own statutory scheme.
I. ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS
Over the past decade, many unions in the United States have
pursued voluntary recognition as a successful alternative to organizing
campaigns structured around elections supervised by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).14 The NLRB has long permitted
employers to participate in neutrality agreements and card check
recognition. Federal courts also have endorsed as conducive to labor
peace a national policy of deferring to labor-management agreements
that waive the right to utilize the Board's election machinery. The
current Bush Board has expressed discomfort with this national
policy, apparently believing that a growth in union organizing and
collective bargaining outside the traditional elections process
compromises the agency's jurisdiction if not its mission.15 On the
other hand, the Employee Free Choice Act 6-supported by organized
labor and pending in Congress with considerable support-would
require the Board to certify unions that have received majority
approval through authorization cards, thereby precluding insistence
on a Board-supervised election.
In this fractious setting, the British approach raises some
intriguing options. The statute provides for a multi-stage procedure,
operating under CAC supervision on a fairly compressed time
schedule. A union initiates the process by applying to the CAC for a
declaration that it should be recognized to conduct collective
bargaining on behalf of a specified group of workers with regard to
14. See generally James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005).
15. Since 2004, the Board's Republican majority has granted review in three cases involving
different aspects of neutrality/card check agreements. See Dana Corp., NLRB Div. of Judges,
JD-24-05 (Apr. 5, 2005); Dana Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1283, 1283-84 (2004); Shaw's Supermarkets,
343 N.L.R.B. 963 (2004). See generally Charles I. Cohen et. al., Resisting its Own Obsolescence-
How the National Labor Relations Board is Questioning the Existing Law of Neutrality
Agreements, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 521 (2006).
16. See H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007).
2007]
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wages, hours of work, and holidays. The CAC must first decide if it
should accept this application, based primarily on whether 10% of the
proposed bargaining unit are union members and a majority of
employees in the unit are likely to support recognition-the latter is
often a function of support demonstrated through petition signatures.
If the CAC accepts the union's application, its second stage is to
decide whether the proposed bargaining unit is appropriate.
Assuming an appropriate bargaining unit, the third CAC stage is
to decide whether recognition should be declared without a ballot. In
order for non-electoral recognition to be considered, more than 50%
of the unit must be union members. Assuming this membership level
is achieved, the CAC will confer recognition without an election
unless either it has received credible evidence that a substantial
number of union members do not want the union to conduct collective
bargaining, or it determines that the interests of good industrial
relations require a ballot. The fourth stage is for the CAC to arrange
for an election if union membership does not exceed 50%, or if
majority membership co-exists with one of the genuinely exceptional
circumstances just described.
The election is preceded by a campaign period of roughly three
weeks, during which the union must be given meaningful access to
employees on the premises. In general, CAC-supervised access allows
the union to conduct one large meeting for every ten days of the
campaign as well as a set of individual or small group meetings for
each ten day period. A union prevails in the election if it receives
support from a majority of those voting; such support also must
constitute at least 40% of all workers in the bargaining unit. If the
union secures CAC recognition either without a ballot or by
prevailing in an election, the employer is barred from challenging the
union's majority status for three years. Conversely, if the union loses
the election or withdraws an application in the later stages, it is barred
from re-applying to the CAC for three years."
Although the British statute is highly prescriptive and contains
strict timetables, it also creates various opportunities and incentives
for employers and unions to opt out of the formal recognition process.
Before a union even applies to the CAC, it must request voluntary
17. For a detailed description of this four-stage process, see CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2005,
supra note 7, at 15-17; CENT. ARB. COMM., THE CAC'S STATUTORY DUTIES, available at
http://www.cac.gov.uk. For discussion of access provisions and other aspects of campaign
regulation, see DEPT. OF TRADE & INDUS., CODE OF PRACTICE: ACCESS AND UNFAIR
PRACTICES DURING RECOGNITION AND DERECOGNITION BALLOTS 13-25 (2005). For a more
general overview, see Nancy Peters, The United Kingdom Recalibrates the U.S. National Labor
Relations Act: Possible Lessons for the United States, 25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 227 (2004).
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recognition from the employer and allow up to thirty days for an
agreement to be reached. If there is interest in voluntary recognition,
the employer and union can call on the CAC's sister organization for
assistance in conducting negotiations. 8
During the four-stage CAC procedure, the employer and union
are free to work out voluntary recognition agreements at any time.
Depending on when such agreements are reached, the employer may
sidestep the intrusive access provisions associated with a CAC
election, and both sides may avoid the prospect of a three year bar on
revisiting the CAC-endorsed outcome. In addition, an employer
choosing the voluntary recognition route bypasses the CAC's model
procedures following recognition that establish certain minimum
standards for the conduct of collective bargaining negotiations.
Although these procedures do not entail any commitment to reaching
a collective bargaining agreement, the litany of prescribed meetings,
written communications, and provision of facilities and information
can be time-consuming and burdensome."
After six years of operation, it appears that the statutory
recognition procedure has generated modest success in the CAG-
supervised arena and more dramatic results in terms of voluntary
agreements. With respect to CAC supervision, unions have won close
to 65% of the elections held. In addition, for union applications that
reach the third stage, the CAC has declared recognition without a
ballot in one instance for every two that are resolved by election.2"
Admittedly, the number of CAC applications has been lower
than initially anticipated; after six years, roughly 40,000 workers have
secured recognition wholly or partially through the CAC procedure.21
Yet over the same period, roughly 2,000 new union recognition
18. See TULRCA, supra note 1, Schedule Al, 10(5) (discussing assistance to be provided
upon request by the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS)). Although ACAS
is under a statutory obligation to furnish the CAC with staff and office premises, the CAC is a
separate entity in operational terms.
19. The specified method for conducting collective bargaining is contained in The Trade
Union Recognition (Method of Collective Bargaining) Order, 2000, S.I. 2000/1300 (U.K.)
[hereinafter STATUTORY INSTRUMENT 1300]. The ADVISORY CONCILIATION & ARB. SERVS.,
CODE OF PRACTICE 2: DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO TRADE UNIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING PURPOSES, is available on the ACAS Web site at
http://www.acas.org.uk/media/pdf/2/q/CP02-1.pdf. See generally TONIA NOVITZ & PAUL
SKIDMORE, FAIRNESS AT WORK 106 (2001).
20. See CENT. ARB. COMM., ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006, 22-23 (2006) (U.K.) [hereinafter
CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2006] (reporting applications through March 2006; of 128 ballots, union
has prevailed in 81; there are 61 additional instances of union being recognized without ballot).
As of August 31, 2006, there have been 132 ballots, of which 82 resulted in recognition, plus 67
additional instances of recognition declared without a ballot. See E-mail from Simon
Gouldstone to author (Sept. 14, 2006) (on file with author).
21. See Gall, supra note 6, at 345-46.
2007]
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agreements have been negotiated in the shadow of the statutory
procedure, covering some 800,000 employees. About 90% of
recognition arrangements in the first six years have resulted from
voluntary agreements without government supervision. The vast
majority of these voluntary agreements provided for collective
bargaining, not simply consultation or "collective representation. ' 2
Several caveats are in order here. Given the British trade union
tradition favoring voluntarism, and the failure of an earlier and more
cumbersome statutory recognition effort, employers and unions
presumably approach the new statutory procedure with certain
reservations. Employers especially may be inclined to opt for an
informal, voluntary approach more reflexively than would their
American counterparts, at least until they have explored possibilities
for resistance under the CAC process.
In addition, the new statutory procedure is hardly a panacea from
British unions' perspective. Access to employer premises is conferred
only after the election period has commenced, not at a point early
enough to aid in informing and recruiting a potential majority.
Remedies for employer unfair practices remain unclear and may not
provide a sufficient deterrent to intentional employer misconduct.
Further, the bargaining procedure triggered by a CAC award of
recognition fails to cover important employment conditions such as
occupational pensions or the promotion of equal opportunities in
allocation of work.23
Incentives to opt out of the new procedure may well diminish
over an extended period. Nonetheless, the early returns, in which
voluntary recognition accounts for more than 90% of newly organized
workers, merit further examination. In particular, certain potentially
durable factors may help account for why employers and unions are so
willing to reach agreements outside the election-oriented statutory
procedure.
To begin with, the procedure itself is sufficiently prescriptive and
potentially burdensome to invite the parties' interest in greater
flexibility. In this regard, employers considering the CAC election
route face several obligations or restrictions not present under U.S.
law. Employers must provide union organizers with extensive and
22. See id., at 346-47; McKay & Moore, supra note 6, at 374; Peters, supra note 17, at 236-
37.
23. See Employment Relations Act, 2004, c. 24, § 20 (U.K.) (excluding occupational
pensions from CAC bargaining procedure applicable to "pay"); NOVITZ & SKIDMORE, supra
note 19, at 101, 110-12 (discussing exclusion of equal opportunities workplace issues from
bargaining procedure).
HeinOnline  -- 28 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 200 2006-2007
RECRAFTING A TROJAN HORSE
regular access on-site during the three week campaign period,
whereas American law allows them to exclude non-employee
organizers from the premises. Employers who lose in a recognition
contest must wait three years before challenging the union's majority
status, while under the NLRA they need only wait twelve months if
no collective bargaining agreement has been signed. In addition,
employers may have to conform to a range of procedural standards in
the conduct of collective bargaining, including the convening of
regular meetings under a formal "staged procedure" and the
disclosure of more information than would likely be required under
U.S. law."
On the other side, unions considering CAC recognition also face
certain headwinds that would not be present under the NLRA. They
must make a stronger majority showing among unit employees-
either more than 50% who are actual union members or electoral
support from over 50% of those who vote including at least 40% of
the bargaining unit.25 Unions that fail to gain statutory recognition
must then wait three years to reapply, whereas under U.S. law they
may petition for a new election after twelve months. Unions that
prevail and proceed to collective negotiations can compel bargaining
only on three topics-pay, hours, and holidays-a smaller list than the
universe of mandatory subjects under the NLRA.26
Because the stakes are relatively high for both sides, employers
and unions each have reasons to want to communicate in a less
structured and more unsupervised setting. Reinforcing these
incentives is the fact that collective bargaining agreements based on
voluntary recognition are not enforceable in court unless the parties
24. See STATUTORY INSTRUMENT 1300, supra note 19, at 4-5 (setting forth details of staged
procedure for bargaining). The ACAS Code of Practice referred to supra at note 19 addresses
disclosure of relevant financial information in detail and without regard to whether an employer
is claiming inability to pay. This seems a broader obligation than would obtain under NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 893-99 (Patrick
Hardin et. al. eds., 4th ed. 2001).
25. The majority membership requirement simply does not exist under U.S. law, although
British unions seeking to recruit over 50% membership do not face the obstacles that would be
posed in our country by state right-to-work laws. The 40% ballot support requirement is more
difficult to satisfy than the NLRB's "majority of votes cast" standard.
26. To be sure, labor unions in the U.S. also have ample incentives to avoid the NLRA's
election-oriented recognition procedure. These incentives, however, reflect primarily
unintended factors that over decades have rendered the Board-sponsored elections system
deeply flawed. I refer here to the employee intimidation caused by lawful and unlawful
employer resistance to unionization, the absence of effective remedies protecting employee free
choice, and the chilling impact of prolonged delays and protracted litigation in the Board and
courts. See Brudney, supra note 14, at 832-34, 868-72, and sources discussed therein. By
contrast, the British statutory incentives referred to in text accompanying supra notes 23-25,
combined with the multi-stage procedure discussed in text below, may be viewed at least in part
as deliberate efforts to foster the development of voluntary recognition arrangements.
2007]
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specify an intent to make their agreement legally binding. The
presumptive lack of enforceability of voluntary labor agreements is a
distinctly British feature, as our labor-management contracts have
been enforceable through the federal courts since 1947. However,
even if a British employer and union decide to make their collective
bargaining agreement binding through the courts, the parties'
negotiations outside the CAC-sponsored procedure may result in
more flexible provisions to modify or abandon the contract. These
negotiations also may cover a larger or smaller number of
employment conditions than are specified under the statute.27
Apart from creating pressure to avoid the burdens inherent in a
CAC-sponsored recognition contest, the statute may encourage
voluntary agreement more affirmatively by structuring prolonged
interactions between the two sides. The statute mandates a period of
up to thirty days in which the union and employer-guided on
occasion by ACAS-are to explore possibilities for voluntary
recognition prior to any consideration of the union's formal
application. There follows a period of roughly four to five weeks
when the CAC is deciding whether to accept the union's application.
As part of this first stage, the CAC needs to verify union membership
and support levels. When the employer questions the accuracy of
union figures and the union seeks to protect the identity of individual
workers, the two sides have often agreed on a confidential process for
checking names under the supervision of a CAC case manager.28
Similarly at the second stage, when the CAC has to identify the
appropriate bargaining unit, the two sides have usually reached
agreement on this issue without the need for a CAC determination;
the proportion of agreed-upon units steadily increased over the first
five years."
It seems plausible that the series of extended dealings between
employer and union under the British statute's multi-stage recognition
approach operates to help allay suspicions on both sides, making it
easier for the parties to contemplate a long-term relationship.30 When
27. In addition, voluntary agreements may cover a minority of employees at a given
worksite. The new statutory procedure is based on majority support and exclusive
representative status, but neither exclusivity nor majoritarianism are required aspects of
voluntary recognition in Britain. See SIMON DEAKIN & GILLIAN MORRIS, LABOUR LAW 69,
827-28 (4th ed. 2005).
28. CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 7, at 15.
29. Id. at 16.
30. The NLRB is also quite successful in encouraging negotiated agreements as to
bargaining unit scope and the identity of eligible voters. See 70 NLRB ANN REP. 14, Table 10
(2005); 69 NLRB ANN. REP. 14, Table 10 (2004) (reporting that some 85% of representation
cases closed by elections involve election arrangements stipulated by the parties with Board
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employers and unions can constructively converse on preliminary
ground rules over a period of several months, facilitated at times by a
government agency, they may tend to develop a degree of mutual
comfort if not respect. The statute's formalized opportunities for
voluntary exchange thus provide channels for engendering reliance
and trust between the parties, important elements in developing a
collective bargaining relationship. In this regard, the detailed
recognition procedure performs a function that is also served when
parties negotiate a neutrality agreement in the U.S. setting. American
unions and employers have used the process of reaching agreement on
certain procedural ground rules to facilitate the possibilities for
longer-term trust on substantive bargaining.
Assuming that the various formal and informal statutory
incentives discussed here have contributed to the initial success of
voluntary recognition under British law, such a result is probably not
inadvertent. Although the new British statute provides no special
protections for voluntary collective bargaining agreements, it also
does not view such agreements as unusual or disfavored. The
expectation that voluntary agreements should co-exist comfortably
with statutory recognition suggests a subtle but important distinction
from NLRA law, which for decades has viewed voluntary recognition
through card check as a legitimate but plainly exceptional doctrinal
alternative.3"
It is possible, of course, for Congress to confer upon majority
support expressed through card check a legal status that co-exists with
election-based majority support not just comfortably but co-equally,
as is proposed under the pending Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA).32 Assuming the Democrats were to gain control of both
Congress and the White House, however, some members of the new
political majority are likely to view employer resistance to
unionization as continuing to warrant special respect, on the theory
that employers can contribute to information-sharing and reasoned
debate thereby enhancing employee free choice. EFCA advocates
assistance). Elections are the endgame in this process, however; because of major difficulties
involved in adversarial election campaigns (discussed at note 26 supra), these stipulated
agreements often do not result in cooperative long term relationships. By contrast, the British
statute does not funnel the parties toward elections in nearly the same way: it begins with a
thirty day period in which the parties are required to pursue prospects for voluntary recognition,
and the CAC's formal procedure ends in a declaration of recognition without an election for
one-third of the cases that reach the pre-ballot stage three (discussed at note 20 supra and
accompanying text).
31. See generally Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 302-10
(1974); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 607 (1969).
32. See H.R. 800, S. 1041, supra note 16.
2007]
HeinOnline  -- 28 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 203 2006-2007
204 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 28:193
counter this argument-that adversarial presentations may be
especially important to employee decisions about workplace
representation-by maintaining that such decisions can be made
freely and fairly in a far less contentious setting. The British
recognition procedure suggests ways to complement the latter
position. By creating a structure that effectively encourages
employers and unions to consider not rolling the electoral dice, while
providing them with extended opportunities for informal exchange
that may augment mutual understanding, the statute increases the
chances that both sides will in the end prefer to pursue a voluntary
recognition strategy.
II. DISCOURAGING DELAY AND PARTISAN ADJUDICATION
This part focuses on two often-criticized aspects of NLRB
adjudicative performance. One is the considerable delay associated
with Board action. When a representation election includes contested
issues, the NLRB typically takes eight to ten months to complete
action, measured from the date employees petitioned to have a
union.33 For unfair labor practice allegations, the waiting period is
even longer-it now takes one and one-half to two years from the
date a charge is filed to the date of Board resolution.34 These
extended periods for agency consideration do not include the
additional one to two years frequently involved when a Board
decision is appealed to the federal circuit courts.
The lion's share of intra-agency delay is consumed by Board
review of initial trial-type determinations. For unfair labor practices,
the time between the post-hearing trial determination of an
administrative law judge and issuance of a Board decision has
averaged thirteen to fifteen months in recent years.35  For
representation cases, the Regional Director typically resolves all
election-related matters within forty days following the petition, but
Board review of contested issues adds an additional seven to nine
months.36
A second frequently identified problem has been the
politicization of Board membership.37 The Congress that created the
33. See NLRB ANN. REP., Table 23, in vols. 61 (1996), 62 (1997), 69 (2004), 70 (2005).
34. See NLRB ANN. REP., Table 23, in vols. 69 (2004), 70 (2005).
35. See sources in supra note 33.
36. See sources in supra note 34.
37. This paragraph and the next summarize points made in a recent prior article. See James
J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
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NLRB conceived of an adjudicative body of non-aligned individuals,
and in its first fifteen years Board appointees came either from
government service or academia. But starting in the 1950s, and
accelerating since 1980, Board membership has become distinctly
partisan. Appointees have been chosen from the management bar in
ever-increasing numbers over half a century, and they almost
invariably return to management-side positions after their short
Board tenure. Attorneys representing unions were not named to the
NLRB until the mid 1990s, but it seems plausible to expect that their
post-Board patterns of professional involvement also will include
reemployment on the side from which they came.
The Board's unabashedly partisan makeup has undercut the
agency's reputation as a neutral and principled adjudicator.
Moreover, because the transformation has occurred during a period of
Republican ascendancy in national politics, many unions and
employees have become deeply disillusioned with the Board as a
possible source for protecting or vindicating their statutory rights. In
theory, the appointment of Board members with expertise in NLRA
law could enhance agency performance even if the expertise were
acquired representing employers. But management-side attorneys are
chosen for Board service through a political appointments process
controlled by a Republican party demonstrably hostile to unions and
their agenda. When these attorneys remain at the Board for short
stints before resuming their management-side careers, it is not
surprising that perceptions of agency bias and lack of independence
have become fairly widespread.38
The new British statute, while broadly modeled on the NLRA,
includes a distinctive approach to both the time spent on adjudication
and the method of appointing adjudicators. Once again, the
differences are potentially instructive.
The CAC's format for resolving labor-management disputes is
simpler and more straightforward than what transpires at the NLRB.
The British agency renders all decisions after hearing evidence and
arguments in a single trial-type proceeding; there is no provision for
appellate review within the CAC. Three-person panels resolve
disputes over whether a recognition application should be accepted,
whether a bargaining unit's scope and size are appropriate, whether
recognition should be declared (without a ballot or following an
J. 221, 243-52 (2005). See also Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution at the Labor Board: The
Transformation of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L. J. 1361 (2000).
38. See generally Michael R. Triplett, 'Bush Board,' State of Labor Law Debated by
Current, Former Members, Practitioners, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at B-1 (Aug. 9, 2006).
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election), and whether unfair practices have been committed during a
campaign (and if so what relief should be awarded). Decisions by a
CAC panel may then be appealed directly to the courts.
In recent years, the CAC has received some 100 recognition
applications on an annual basis.3 9 The agency's caseload should
increase-perhaps substantially-in the near future, as Parliament
established the existence of unfair practices and gave jurisdiction to
the CAC effective in late 2005.4o Even with unfair practice cases, the
number of CAC panel decisions following hearings is unlikely to
approach the annual figures for hearing-based resolution of election
disputes and unfair labor practice complaints under the NLRA.41 The
smaller scale of CAC operations is primarily attributable to the
smaller size of the national labor force covered under British law. Not
surprisingly, the number of potential NLRB decisionmakers at this
evidentiary level-regional directors or their designees, and
administrative law judges-well exceeds the number who appear on
the lists from which CAC panels are chosen.4"
The average duration of a CAC case-from application to final
agency resolution- is about 140 days. This is somewhat shorter than
the average time between issuance of an unfair labor practice
complaint and an administrative law judge decision following trial,
though somewhat longer than the average time between filing of a
representation petition and final action by a regional director. More
important, the 140 days for CAC determinations subject to judicial
review compares very favorably to the current averages for NLRB
cases that include appellate review by Board members-286 days
39. See CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2005, supra note 7, at 8-9 (describing fluctuation between
80 and 116 annual applications over past four years).
40. See id. at 2 (discussing unfair practices under 2004 Employment Relations Act, which
became effective in October 2005). There were no unfair practice complaints filed with the
CAC as of March 31, 2006. See CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 20, at 4. Subsequently,
the CAC has issued three unfair labor practice decisions, holding on two occasions that the
employer's campaign activities did not amount to unlawful conduct and on the third occasion
that the union's campaign conduct was not unlawful. See TGWU and Comet Group plc, No.
TUR1/501 (17 Aug. 2006); GMB and JF Stone Investments Ltd., No. TUR1/492 (1 Nov. 2006);
Prospect & PCS and National Maritime Museum, No. TUR1/529 (5 Dec. 2006). All three
decisions are on file with author and available at http://www.cac.gov.uk.
41. See, e.g., 70 NLRB ANN. REP. 2 (2005) (administrative law judges issued 287 decisions
of which 17 were noncomplaint election objection cases); id. at 14 (Regional Directors
completed hearings in some 375 disputed representation cases (7.5% of 5,047 closed cases)).
42. There are forty-nine Regional Offices and sub-offices of the NLRB, each with several
attorneys who may conduct hearings on representation disputes. There are fifty administrative
law judges charged with conducting hearings and rendering decisions in unfair labor practice
cases. For listings of regulatory offices and sub-offices, and the Division of Judges, see
http://www.nlrb.gov/about-us/locating-our-offices/index.aspx. By contrast, the CAC's three-
person panels consist of members from three distinct lists that in total consist of some sixty-five
individuals. See CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 20, at 8-9.
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spent on representation cases and 659 days on unfair labor practice
cases. 3 Elimination of the Board's separate review stage thus raises
the possibility of reducing time expended inside the agency by some
50-75%.
Simplifying the NLRB's adjudication process in this way would
presumably result in other adjustments. Administrative law judges
could become neutral members of adjudicative panels based on the
CAC model discussed below. In addition, the CAC's centralized and
smaller-scale operation make it relatively easy to remain familiar with
agency precedent and to develop case law in predictable terms.
Reliance on a larger and more dispersed adjudicative network that
includes regional administrators and/or administrative law judges may
require a mechanism to assure regular information-sharing and
encourage consistency in the elaboration of legal standards. There
also may be a need to address how decentralized adjudication would
dovetail with the promulgation of rules, assuming the agency
overcomes its longstanding reluctance to engage in such rulemaking.
Still, these and other adjustments might well be deemed minor details
if agency adjudication could be expedited in such dramatic fashion.
With respect to the identity of adjudicators, the CAC-like the
current NLRB -draws members directly from the union and
management sectors. Its methods of appointment, compensation, and
recruitment, however, diverge sharply from what is provided for and
practiced under the NLRA.
The CAC operates through tripartite panels, assembled for each
new case or dispute from the membership of three distinct rosters.
The twenty-nine members with experience as representatives of
employers are mostly current or former directors of personnel or
human resources at major firms, or they are human resources
consultants. The twenty-seven members with experience as
representatives of workers are primarily current or former high
ranking officials in a trade union. The eleven deputy chairmen who
preside over panels are mostly career academics in law, industrial
relations, or human resources management, although several are trial
judges on the Employment Tribunal."
43. See 70 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 23 (2005). See also 69 NLRB ANN. REP., Table 23
(2004) (reporting average of 304 days spent on representation cases that include Board appellate
review and average of 690 days on unfair labor practice cases that include Board appellate
review).
44. See CAC ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 20, at 8-9, for list of sixty-eight current
CAC members and their affiliations. The CAC Chairman, Sir Michael Burton, is a high court
judge. The Employment Tribunal is a specialized court that reviews statutory workplace-related
2007]
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Members serve and are compensated on a part-time basis. The
average time commitment is three days each month, and members are
paid at a fixed daily rate (about $450 in 2005) as well as being
reimbursed for travel and subsistence expenses. 5 Persons interested
in becoming CAC members apply to and are appointed by the
Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), initially for
three years. Assuming satisfactory performance, they will normally be
offered re-appointment for additional three year terms until being
terminated at age seventy. The CAC includes a permanent staff that
is responsible for investigation, assessment, and advice related to
pending cases, carried out under the direction of panel members.
Candidates for CAC membership submit a lengthy application
form to DTI that emphasizes a consensual rather than partisan
approach. Candidates must, for instance, describe experiences from
professional life in which they overcame a risk of bias when making
difficult objective decisions, helped a group to achieve consensus and
assume collective responsibility, and succeeded in a particularly
challenging negotiation experience." Personal interviews and
extensive telephone references also are part of the recruitment
process.
In addition to significant experience at senior operational levels,
and demonstrable expertise in negotiation and/or collective
bargaining, successful candidates are evaluated for personal
characteristics related to impartiality and consensus building. Traits
emphasized in the selection process include the ability to ensure that
judgment is not swayed by personal bias or interests, to challenge the
opinions of others constructively, to resolve conflicting positions and
interests using a realistic and practical approach, and to command the
trust and respect of colleagues.47
In short, the Central Arbitration Committee is structured and
recruited to perform as a somewhat loose-knit board of arbitrators.
Empanelled on a part-time basis, those appointed from the
management or labor sectors retain their day jobs. When providing
periodic service as collective decisionmakers, members do not sit on
particular panels that could create a conflict of interest.
claims involving inter alia race and sex discrimination, wrongful discharge, and safety and health
violations.
45. See DEPT. OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, 2005 APPLICATION MATERIALS, (U.K.) (on file
with author) [hereinafter DTI FORM], listing £233 as daily rate. As of April 1, 2006, Deputy
Chairs receive £429 per day and members with experience representing employers or workers
receive £242 per day. See E-mail, supra at note 20.
46. See DTI FORM, supra note 45.
47. See id.
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Despite coming from partisan backgrounds, CAC members seem
to have transcended the interests of their current or former
employers. The CAC has issued over 500 decisions related to
statutory recognition since June 2000, and as a matter of policy all
decisions are published as unanimous.4" Moreover, judicial review has
been sought in only eight of these 500-plus decisions, and courts have
reversed the CAC exactly three times.49
The parties' deferential stance toward CAC decisions over the
first five years must be placed in some perspective. Agency decisions
thus far have involved recognition disputes rather than unfair labor
practices; the latter may be more likely to trigger requests for judicial
review. In addition, the CAC's panel structure follows a relatively
established adjudicatory model in British workplace law. Specialized
labor courts, comprised of tripartite panels chaired by a neutral, have
been resolving individual employment disputes since the 1970s with
no evidence of bias or partisanship. ° Nonetheless, the remarkable
absence of polarization among management and labor appointees to
the CAC, and the litigants' widespread willingness to accept agency
decisions as final, are at least advertisements for further consideration
of this approach.
The model of a tripartite arbitration board comprised of part-
time members is certainly not the norm in American administrative
law. The Railway Labor Act (RLA) provides for tripartite panels to
assume jurisdiction over so-called "minor" disputes.51 Although these
48. See Simon Gouldstone & Gillian Morris, The Central Arbitration Committee, in THE
CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL FACE OF BRITISH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS 79, 82 (Linda Dickens
& Alan C. Neal eds., 2006). Gouldstone (the CAC's Director of Policy and Operations) and
Morris (one of the CAC's eleven deputy chairs), add that "in practice, there is a high degree of
consensus within panels." The CAC has other statutory responsibilities besides union
recognition and derecognition; it also handles applications for disclosure of information related
to collective bargaining, disputes over the composition of European works councils, and
applications under the U.K. information and consultation procedure as well as the European
Company Statute. These other areas of dispute occupy only a small portion of CAC time and
resources; the vast majority of CAC effort at present is devoted to statutory recognition.
49. In BECTU and the BBC (Case No. TUR 1/253) (26 Aug. 2003), the court ordered the
CAC to rehear the issue of whether certain freelance cameramen/women fell within the
statutory definition of "worker." In TSSA and Gatwick Express (Case No. TUR 1/261) (2 Sept.
2003) the court ordered the CAC to arrange for a ballot, quashing the panel's earlier decision to
award recognition without a ballot. In GMB & URTU and Ultraframe (UK) Ltd. (Case No.
TUR 1/313) (23 May 2005), the court quashed the CAC's decision to re-run a ballot, and the
ballot result therefore stood. All three decisions are on file with author and available at
http://www.cac.gov.uk.
50. See JEREMY MCMULLEN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL PROCEDURES 3-11 (2002);
John K. MacMillan, Employment Tribunals: Philosophies and Practicalities, 28 INDUS. L. J. 33,
37-43 (1999).
51. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, First (i),(l); 153, Second (2000); THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, 52, 64-
67, 72-73, 405-20 (Douglas L. Leslie Ed., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAILWAY LABOR ACT];
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cases primarily require the interpretation of contract terms rather
than statutory provisions, Congress in the RLA did decide that the
various adjustments boards would have exclusive jurisdiction
including the power to impose final and complete remedies.
5 2
More recently, Congress in 1993 authorized the creation of three-
member Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels (CARPs) to help
resolve disputes regarding royalty fees for the commercial use of
certain copyrighted materials.53 The Librarian of Congress selected a
pool of qualified arbitrators based on certain criteria and
recommendations from professional arbitration associations. Panel
members served part time and were compensated on an hourly basis;
their recommended decisions were adopted unless deemed by the
Librarian to be arbitrary or contrary to the statute.54
There are, of course, objections that could be raised to a system
of tripartite adjudication by part time arbitrators. Concerns about
possible lack of predictability or consistency, bias stemming from
inexperience as well as prejudice, and fiscal burdens in a high-volume
setting would have to be addressed. The original tripartite National
Labor Board, created by President Roosevelt in 1933 based on the
early New Deal model of collaborative industrial self-government,
foundered in a matter of months, although largely for reasons other
than consistency, bias, and cost.5
At the same time, we have entered an era in which arbitrators
serving a part-time public law function often resolve the statutory
claims of individual employees on an ad hoc basis, leaving these
FRANK N. WILNER, THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND THE DILEMMA OF LABOR RELATIONS 53
(1991).
52. See RAILWAY LABOR ACT, supra note 51, at 406-12; Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 373 U.S. 33, 38 (1963). The RLA provides for a
National Railway Adjustment Board (NRAB) with four divisions, each of which processes
disputes involving distinct categories of employees. Each division has an equal number of
members (from three to five) selected by management and labor; if a division cannot reach a
majority decision, it selects a neutral member to sit on the case as well. There is also provision
for limited judicial review. The RLA further authorizes parties to create by contract Special
Boards of Adjustment (SBAs) that will resolve inter-party disputes. These SBAs typically
consist of three members-one from the railroad, one from the labor organization, and a neutral
chair.
53. See Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat.
2304 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-419
(2004) (replacing arbitration panels with Copyright Royalty Judges).
54. See Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel Rules and Procedures, 37 C.F.R. §§ 251.3,
251.5, 251.6 (2006); Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel (CARP) Structure and Process: Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights); 107 Stat. 2306 (1993).
55. See generally GUIDE TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD 7-8 (Gordon T. Law, Jr. ed., 2002).
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employees with limited recourse to agency or judicial review. 6 Given
our investment in arbitration as a strategy for disposing of workplace
law controversies, it seems worth exploring whether the structured
and continuous arbitral approach developed in Britain might provide
for adjudication in the labor-management arena relatively insulated
from the heat of partisan agendas. Such an approach could allow for
decisionmaking that is more likely to instill confidence in the rule of
law than what has been occurring under our status quo.
CONCLUSION
This article has presented some modest ideas borrowed from
recent British experience that could apply to a relative corner of the
contemporary workplace law landscape. Improving the
administration and enforcement of our national labor relations statute
is not as pivotal as addressing the systemic absence of just cause
protections or enabling unions to speak for employees outside of the
collective bargaining setting. Still, changes such as those discussed
here can help to broaden participation and enhance fairness in
workplace governance.
At various points, the article has referenced Britain's distinctive
approach to voluntarism in labor-management relations. The British
tradition of viewing collective bargaining agreements as undertakings
"binding in honour" rather than enforceable at law57 is indicative of
managerial attitudes toward unions that are notably less hostile than
those now prevalent in the United States. Yet employer perspectives
on unionization are not frozen in time or irreversible. Management
responses to unions in the United States shifted from massive defiance
in the late 1930s to relatively uneventful acceptance in the late 1950s,
before reverting to a position of broad-based hostility that has
characterized recent decades. 58  Moreover, government rules and
institutions interact with the culture of labor-management relations,
and the law may operate as a causal influence, not merely a reflection
of underlying values or beliefs. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume
that the most recent growth of management hostility in the United
States is something less than fixed and permanent, and that future
56. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
57. See Ford Motor Co., Ltd. v. Amalg. Union of Eng'g & Foundry Workers, [1969] 2 All
Eng. Rep. 481,491-96 (Q.B.).
58. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Representation
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1774-86 (1993); John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, &
the "Union-Free" Movement in the U.S.A. since the 1970s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197 (2002).
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changes in labor law are capable of influencing employer attitudes
toward unions.
Paul Weiler persuasively demonstrated back in 1990 that unions
and collective bargaining remain important to substantial segments of
our workforce. In that context, recent British experience suggests
possibilities for using a revised statutory structure to encourage
voluntary agreements, as well as to expedite and de-politicize the
process of adjudicating labor disputes. These possibilities emanate,
somewhat ironically, from a statute that itself borrowed heavily from
the "gift" of our own NLRA. That gift was understandably viewed
with some suspicion at the time, and the experience of less than a
decade is hardly conclusive in removing initial concerns. Nonetheless,
for purposes of contemplating potential changes in American labor
law, certain recrafted design features of the British model deserve our
consideration.
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